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to allow such an important limitation or right to be eliminated without
the clearest evidence of intent of the parties to do so,89 particularly since
it is not uncommon for a party to seek to put even clearly implied rights
in writing or to broaden existing rights with express contract terms."
V. CONCLUSION
Suggesting the need for and desirability of a standard for deciding
subcontracting disputes may be symptomatic of a necessary development
in the entire labor arbitration process. As it matures as a means of
settling labor disputes, arbitration seems to be following the general
pattern of the development of equity and administrative law. With age
tribunals acquire collective experience and the sources of their rulings
inevitably become routinized. This result is brought about by many fac-
tors, and among the most significant is the tendency of the parties, as the
tribunal becomes older and more respected, to raise the stakes by bringing
before it disputes of increasing importance. When the stakes rise, the
need for the greater certainty of result which is afforded by a clearly
articulated standard increases. Already the handling by -arbitrators of
problems of "just cause" in dismissals has become standardized. Sub-
contracting now seems ripe for similar treatment. Perhaps the time is
not so distant when arbitrators will evolve a set of standards for the
recurring problems of shop and industry which, like the subcontracting
standard proposed, will be compatible with the much prized informality
of the arbitration process and yet will provide the necessary certainty
and uniformity of result.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:
STATE POLICY AND THE INDEPENDENT FEDERAL FORUM
The Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" initiated the first of
89. To show the required clear and unmistakable waiver it would seem necessary
to prove that in rejecting a proposed subcontracting term the parties had agreed that
all limits on subcontracting were waived. It also seems reasonable, however, to presume
that if such a drastic agreement had been reached it would have been included in the
written agreement. In other words, the fact that the agreement is silent on subcon-
tracting rebuts the contention that rejection shows waiver clearly and unmistakably.
90. "Yet it would be unrealistic to interpret futile bargaining efforts as meaning
the parties were in agreement that the Agreement implies no restriction at all. Parties
frequently try to solidify through bargaining a position which they could otherwise take,
or to broaden rights which might arguably exist." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 1213, 1218 (1962) (Russell A. Smith), Cf., United States Potash Co., 37 Lab.
Arb. 442 (1961) (Carl R. Schedler). Contra, Collins Radio Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 180
(1962) (Roy R. Ray); Square D Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 892 (1961) (Edwin R. Teple).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
NOTES
two 1938 reforms designed to clarify the principles of federalism which
underly federal diversity jurisdiction.2 After Erie federal courts were
required to look not only to state statutes, but also to state court decisions
in ascertaining the law to be effected in diversity actions.' When the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect later the same year the
evolution was complete. While Erie supplanted the "uniform" federal
common law by requiring federal courts to conform to the policy em-
bodied in the statutory and decisional law of the forum-state, use of the
uniform system of adjective law provided by the Federal Rules super-
ceded the practice of federal conformity to state procedure. These
changes appeared complementary. The uniform system of procedure
did not enlarge, modify or abridge the substantive rights of litigants,4 and
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides in part, "The judicial power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States. . . " The
Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by the First Congress pursuant to the grant of thejudicial power in article III of the Constitution, established the federal court system,
stating that:
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law, or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of all costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen of the state
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. The act further provided for removal
to a federal court where a diversity action was commenced in a state court against an
out-of-state defendant. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. These provisions
have remained substantially unchanged, except for periodic increases in the jurisdictional
sum which is now fixed at $10,000, and are presently found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,
1441(a), (b) (1958).
Perhaps the most frequently advanced reason for the inclusion of the enabling
provision of article III in the Constitution and the portion of the Judiciary Act of
1789 creating diversity jurisdiction, is that such measures arose from an apprehension
that provincialism would prejudice the rights of the out-of-state litigant if left to seek
his remedies in state courts. See, e.g., Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of r789, 37 HARv. L. Ray. 49, 83 (1923). This grant of originaljurisdiction in matters of diversity was a subject of lively controversy at its
inception and has been continually subjected to grave doubts. Warren, supra at 82. The
American Law Institute, in a recent review of the functions of federal diversity juris-
diction, concluded that while present conditions may not justify a contemporary establish-
ment of such jurisdiction, it should be retained unless it can be asserted with confidence
that the shortcomings of state court justice which originally gave rise to it no longer
exist to any significant degree. ALI, STUDY OF THE DivIs ON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 40 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).
3. The Rules of Decision Act, which was enacted in 1789 by the First Congress,
provides: The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases
vhere they apply. Rav. STAT. § 721 (1875). (Emphasis supplied.) This act has been
amended and now applies to civil actions generally. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), it was held that Congress had
intended "the laws of the several states" to include only state statutes, and where the
state legislature had not spoken, the federal "general common law" applied. It was this
distinction which was repudiated when Erie overruled Swift.
4. The enabling act under which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the
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it appeared equally clear that recognition of state substantive policy did
not detract from the authority of the federal courts to prescribe their own
procedure.'
While the reforms initiated in 1938 represented substantial changes
in judicial approach to the controversial problem of diversity jurisdiction,
they were grounded firmly upon principles of federalism which had been
accepted since the time of the constitutional convention. Foremost of
these principles is that a government's legislative and judicial power
should be co-extensive. However, where cases arising under state law
are adjudicated in the federal courts, the judicial power of the state is
less extensive than its legislative power. This disparity threatens to in-
terfere with the federal plan of state autonomy to promulgate policy
through legislative and judicial processes.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for a majority of the Court in Erie,
chose to emphasize that the federal plan of state autonomy was implicit in
the Constitution. He used this premise as a basis for the assertion that
Congress, and hence the federal judiciary, lacked the constitutional power
to make substantive law applicable to diversity cases.' This declaration
of constitutional law was doubted in its inception and has failed to gain
the Court's acceptance in subsequent years.8 Nonetheless, the soundness
of the Erie doctrine as a principle of federalism seldom has been doubted.
It is appropriate that the policy of the forum-state should define the
rights and obligations which flow from relationships and transactions that
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
of the district courts of the United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
5. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). The Sibbach case involved the
application of FED. R. CiV. P. 35, which provides for a physical examination in a personal
injury action brought in a federal district court by virtue of diversity of citizenship.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected the plaintiff's contention that Erie prevented
federal courts from applying the rule where there was no comparable provision in the
applicable state law. In upholding the application of the rule, the majority relied upon
the "undoubted power" of the federal judicial system to regulate the procedure to be
followed in its courts. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the dissenting justices,
thought that the labelling of the rule as substantive or procedural offered little assistance
in resolving the matter. Rather, the question as he viewed it, was whether the federal
rule interferred with the inviolability of the person.
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Hamilton) for a discussion of the significant role
this principle played in giving form to the federal judicial system.
7. 304 U.S. at 78.
8. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, id. at 90. The Court made a
passing reference to the constitutional doctrine in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (dictum). As Judge Clark has stated, the constitutional
articulation "seems to have been rather carefully avoided by the Court ever since."
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Eric v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE LJ. 267, 273 (1946).
NOTES
are the legitimate concern of the state. Only in this manner can state
autonomy be insured in matters committed to state regulation.
The significant corollary of Erie is the principle that the functioning
of the federal judicial process, a matter of primary federal concern, is to
be governed by federal law. Thus, federal adjective law presumably ap-
plies to all litigation in federal courts irrespective of the source of the
substantive right being asserted. Rules traditionally labelled "proced-
ural," however, often express a state policy which is equally as funda-
mental as that embodied in its "substantive" law. Thus, the substance-
procedure dichotomy formulated by Erie and its progeny offers little as-
sistance in determining whether state or federal law governs a particular
incident of litigation.
The evolution of the Erie doctrine during the quarter-century since
its inception may be characterized as an unceasing effort to establish a
sound delineation between the state and federal interests which are in-
volved in diversity litigation. The outcome-determinative test of
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,' adopted in an attempt to correct the inade-
quacy of the substance-procedure dichotomy by requiring federal courts
to conform to state rules in all matters which might influence the result
of litigation,"0 was hardly a significant improvement when judged by its
success in implementing the principles of federalism. While the substance-
procedure standard failed to assess adequately state interests, the outcome
test did not accord sufficient weight to federal interests since the only
matters evidencing federal judicial independence were a residuum of rules
regarded as too insignificant to affect outcome.
Recent cases indicate a new approach to the problem of meaning-
fully delineating state and federal spheres of interest in diversity litiga-
tion." They acknowledge that there exist significant federal interests
which must be balanced against the benefits of outcome uniformity. The
approach they embody requires adherence to federal concepts of trial, not
because the conduct of trial is thought too insignificant to alter outcome,
but because the dignity of the federal judicial power requires a high degree
of independence when administering justice to all litigants properly invok-
ing that power. The following evaluation of this approach examines the
fundamental considerations which ultimately must guide any rational de-
marcation between state and federal authority in diversity litigation, and
seeks to determine whether it offers standards that will allow a sound
9. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See text accompanying note 12 infra.
10. Id. at 99.
11. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
For a discussion of these cases see text accompanying notes 28-45 infra.
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delineation between state and federal control over the conduct of trial in
diversity cases.
I. OUTCOME-DETERMINISM: STATE DOR-CLOSING DEVICES
The early cases following Erie recognized the inadequacy of the
substance-procedure dichotomy as a formula for allocating control over
diversity litigation between state and federal law. The most obvious
weakness was its failure to recognize that rules traditionally regarded as
procedural are often as decisive of litigation as substantive law. Dis-
regard of the importance of such rules by federal courts would have been
incongruous with the prevailing view that the import of Erie was to pre-
vent the fortuity of diverse citizenship from resulting in dispositions sub-
stantially different from those that would have obtained in state courts.
This rationale led ultimately to Guaranty Trust. There the Court, hold-
ing that Erie required application of a New York statute of limitations
barring plaintiff's claim in a diversity action, articulated the outcome de-
terminative test which became the sole criterion for delineating state and
federal interests in diversity cases:
In essence, the intent of [Erie] . . . was to insure that, in all
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely be-
cause of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried in a State court. 2
Under the outcome-determinative standard, whether the rule in question
was regarded as procedural or substantive was immaterial. If disregard
of the state rule would result in an outcome different from that which
would obtain in state courts, the rule was determinative of the litigation's
outcome and thus controlling. A federal court exercising diversity of
citizenship was regarded, practically speaking, as merely another court of
the state."
Guaranty Trust was the first in a line of decisions applying the out-
come test to state door-closing devices. These cases established that the
exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction is confined to controversies cog-
nizable in courts of the forum-state. Application of the outcome test was,
for example, held to deny access to the federal forum to a mortgagee
where a state statute prohibited issuance of deficiency judgments on
foreclosure,'" and to a plaintiff failing to comply with a state requirement
12. 326 U.S. at 109.
13. Ibid.
14. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Bullington had originally brought
an action in a North Carolina state court to recover a deficiency judgment. In that
NOTES
of posting security for the costs of defending an unsuccessful stock-
holder's derivative action.'" Nor were federal courts open to plaintiffs
not qualifying to do business within the state who were previously denied
access to state courts, 6 and to those who failed to institute an action by
giving notice within the time required by a state statute of limitations. 7
action the state's supreme court held that state law barred the requested relief. Bulling-
ton v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E.2d 411 (1941). Bullington then brought a new action
in the federal district court On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
a court of appeals judgment which had affirmed a district court order granting the
requested relief. Holding that Bullington's failure to appeal the state court action waived
any constitutional question involved in North Carolina's failure to recognize deficiency
judgments, the Court reasoned that since a federal tribunal exercising diversity juris-
diction is merely another forum of the state whose purpose is to effectuate state policy,
the merits of a claim once litigated -by the state court cannot be re-examined in a federal
court enforcing the state-created rights. Although the case involved the issue of resjudicata, Air. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, concluded that the jurisdiction
of the federal court to entertain the question of state law was, under the outcome test,
no broader than that of the state court. In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S.
535 (1949), the Court rejected counsel's contention that the part of the Angel opinion
which dealt with application of the state door-closing rule was merely dictum, stating
it was an "alternative ground" for the decision.
15. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 538 (1949). For a dis-
cussion of the case see text accompanying note 19 infra.
16. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). The Supreme Court in
Woods reversed a circuit court decision which had held that a state rule denying judicial
relief to parties who had not qualified to do business within the state did not destroy the
plaintiff's cause of action, but merely created a disability to sue in the state courts.
The plaintiff thus was left free to pursue his remedy in federal court. Interstate Realty
Co. v. Woods, 170 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948). The circuit court had relied upon David
Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912) where the Court, when faced
with the identical issue, had held the state disability inapplicable in the federal forum
on the thory that "the State could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors in the courts
of the United States, and could not deprive of their privileges those who were entitled
under the Constitution and laws of the United States to resort to the Federal courts
for the enforcement of a valid contract." Id. at 499.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a majority of the Court in Woods, held that the
Lupton case could no longer be regarded as authority in view of Erie and Guaranty Trust.
"The York case was premised on the theory that a right which local law creates gut
which it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement
in a federal court in a diversity case; that where in such cases one is barred from
recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court." 337 U.S.
at 535, 538.
17. Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). In
Ragan the Court was faced with the question of whether FED. R. Civ. P. 3, which
provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, or a divergent state
rule, providing that an action commences upon service of process upon the defendant,
applied in determining whether the plaintiff had brought an action within the time
allowed by the state statute of limitations as required by Guaranty Trust. Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, reasoned that the state rule applied since when dealing
with a state-created right, "where local law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court
must follow suit. Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause of action in one
court than in the other. . . ." 337 U.S. at 533.
Mir. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent to the Cohen case, expressed disagreement with
the result reached in Ragan and Woods as well. 337 U.S. at 557. Although expressing
"grave doubt" that the Erie doctrine has any constitutional foundation, he approved of
the doctrine "insofar as it involves a wise rule of administration for the federal
courts. . . ." Id. at 558. However, he felt that the majority had gone too far in the
instant cases. This extension of the Erie doctrine, in his opinion, required a "mechanical"
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While a fortiori the failure to apply state door-closing devices in the
federal forum would result in an outcome different than in the state court,
these decisions can be sustained on considerations more fundamental than
uniformity of outcome. State rules which limit access to courts often
express a state policy adopted in response to an obligation to protect local
interests. Such policy is equally compelling whether embodied in a
statute affirmatively conferring a substantive right, or in statutory or
decisional rules limiting the circumstances under which that right may be
vindicated. The significance of the role which door-closing devices may
play in regulating state-created relationships is illustrated by Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.8
The Cohen case involved a state statute requiring minority share-
holders in stockholder derivative actions to post security for the fees and
expenses which the defendant might reasonably be expected to incur in
defending the action. 9 The defendant's statutory right to reimbursement
for fees and expenses in the event the plaintiff's action should be unsuc-
cessful was limited to the security posted. It is clear that this statute was
intended as more than a manner of enforcing a state-created right of re-
covery. The fact that the act applied only to minority stockholders in-
dicated a state policy of protecting the corporation, its officers, and the
majority of its stockholders from the abuses of spurious and vexatious
stockholder derivative litigation. While the state-created stockholder's
derivative action is a right designed to protect shareholders from the
wrongful acts of corporate management, the limitations imposed on its
exercise are intended to protect shareholders from the substantial costs
they would indirectly incur through its misuse. The limitation is thus an
important part of the state policy which defines the rights of the litigants.
It is not suggested that every limitation which a state imposes upon
the right to judicial relief is an integral part of state policy defining the
closing of the doors of the federal courts, and seriously impaired the authority of the
federal judicial power to control the procedure of its courts.
18. 337 U.S. 538 (1949).
19. N.J. REv. STAT. 14:3-15 (1945), provides:
In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign
corporation by the holder or holders of shares . . . having a total par value or
stated value of less than five per centum (5%) of the aggregate par value of
stated capital value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation's stock of
every class . . . the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be
entitled, at any stage of the proceeding before final judgment, to require the
complainant or complainants to give security for the reasonable expenses, includ-
ing counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action
and by the other parties defendant . . . to which the corporation shall have
recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the
termination of such action.
588
NOTES
rights which attach to a state-created relationship." However, where a
state in the legitimate exercise of its powers to regulate matters of local
concern imposes limitations upon a state-created right-whether through
a direct regulation as in the Cohen case, or by imposing general restric-
tions such as a statute of limitations-the policy expressed by those re-
strictions should be effectuated in the federal forum. Disregard of these
limitations would afford a litigant ready means for circumventing state
policy. It is precisely this abuse of the federal judicial power against
which Erie militates.2'
It has been argued that state door-closing provisions should not af-
fect diversity suits commenced in the federal forum on the ground that
state law cannot enlarge or diminish the congressionally established juris-
diction of federal courts.22 State law, it is contended, cannot be applied
where it would interfere with the federal judicial process and thus impair
the integrity of the Article III judicial powers.2" Of course if Brandeis'
constitutional premise were accepted this contention would fail, 4 for Con-
gress could not by extending diversity jurisdiction confer a right, i.e., the
right to judicial relief, where none existed under state law. As noted
above this constitutional rationale has failed to gain the Court's accep-
tance, but an alternative ground for upholding the application of state
door-closing provisions has- been advanced. Under it Erie is viewed
20. See, e.g., Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960),
discussed in text accompanying note 50 infra.
21. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), a case which precipitated the downfall of Swift v. Tyson,
presented just such a situation. There, Brown & Yellow and a railway company, both
Kentucky corporations operating in Kentucky, desired to enter an agreement which
would give the former the exclusive privilege to solicit passenger and baggage trans-
portation at the latter's terminal. As such a contract would have been void under the
Kentucky common law, it was agreed that Brown & Yellow re-incorporate under the
law of Tennessee and that the contract be executed in Tennessee. Subsequently, Brown
& Yellow petitioned the district court to enjoin competition by Black & White.
See also, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), where it was
held that it was necessary to apply the forum-state's doctrine of conflict of laws to
prevent a non-resident litigant from thwarting forum-state policy. For a recent discussion
of the problems engendered by Klaxon see Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State
Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228 (1964).
22. This was the theory of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in First
National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952). There the Court
was faced with applying in a diversity action an Illinois statute which provided that no
action of wrongful death could be maintained in Illinois where the death occured out-
side the state and the defendant was subject to service of process in the state where the
death occured. ILL. STAT. c. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1962). The majority held that the
statute violated the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. Mr. Justice
Jackson concurred on the ground that while the statute might be properly applied in the
state courts, it could not operate to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 342
U.S. at 398. See also David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912).
23. See the dissents of Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Woods, Cohen and Ragan
cases in note 17 supra. And for the relevant text of article III see note 2 supra.
24. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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merely as a new interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act,2" and state
jurisdictional requirements are said to be "rules of decision" which fed-
eral courts are required to apply.2" But this argument overlooks the limi-
tation upon state rules of decision: state law applies in federal courts
"except where . . . acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."
Congress, pursuant to the powers granted it by Article III of the Consti-
tution, has legislated specific jurisdictional requirements which define
the scope of the federal judicial power, and thus has brought the matter
of jurisdiction within the act's exception.
Application of state door-closing provisions need not, however, rest
upon federal assimilation of state jurisdictional requirements as rules of
decision, nor upon lack of congressional authority to regulate jurisdiction
in diversity cases. The issue does not go to the dignity of federal judicial
power, but rather to the integrity of the rights and obligations which
stem from state-created relationships. The federal judicial power ex-
tends to the adjudication of state-created rights in controversies between
citizens of different states. However, where by the terms of the state
policy which defines those rights the litigants are not entitled to judicial
relief, they have no standing to invoke that power. It is thus difficult to
understand how federal judicial power is threatened by closing the doors
of federal courts to litigants who are not entitled to relief by the terms of
the right they assert. If it is thought unseemly to apply state rules to deny
relief in federal forums, the result would appear an inherent weakness in a
federal system where one forum is called upon to enforce rights which
are created and defined by the policy of a non-coordinate sovereign.
It is quite a different question, however, whether state rules may
direct the manner in which litigation is conducted after the federal judi-
cial power is properly invoked and the parties are beyond the doors of
a federal court.
II. CONDUCT OF TRIAL: THE BYRD-SIMLER APPROACH
Application of the outcome-determinative test to rules governing
conduct of trial leaves much to be desired. It is apparent that rules per-
taining to the orderly administration of justice do not "determine" the
result of litigation with the certainty of statutes of limitation. They are
but one of several variables which combine to bring about the outcome of
an action, and speculation as to the impact which they might have upon
25. See note 3 supra.
26. This argument is developed in Note, State Statutes Depriving State Courts of
Jurisdiction as Affected by the Rides of Erie v. Tompkins, 56 YALE L.J. 1037 (1947).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). In his concurring opinion in First National Bank of
Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 398 (1952), Mr. Justice Jackson refuted the
argument on the ground that Congress has "otherwise required and provided." Id. at 400.
NOTES
the result of litigation can lead only to unnecessarily compromising aspects
of trial which are unique to the federal judicial process. Moreover, no
meaningful purpose could be attributed diversity jurisdiction if federal
courts were merely "another court of the state," applying state law in all
matters which conceivably might affect outcome. The Constitution
charges the federal judiciary to provide an independent forum for the
adjudication of state-created rights in diversity matters. Thus, the very
existence of diversity jurisdiction presupposes that the conduct of litiga-
tion often may have a substantial influence upon state-created rights.
And, where divergent state and federal rules reflect different concepts
of the judicial function, the need for federal judicial independence is all
the greater because the different rules are likely to produce different out-
comes. If Erie is applied to deny federal judicial independence in mat-
ters pertaining to the administration of justice, the essence of diversity
jurisdiction is lost.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.28 the Court rejected
the concept that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is merely
another court of the state, and recognized that considerations other than
identity of outcome must determine what law is to govern the conduct of
trial. The Byrd case involved a negligence action brought in the federal
district court by virtue of diversity of citizenship. The defendant con-
tended that a state workmen's compensation act provided the plaintiff an
exclusive remedy. The district court, adhering to the act's provision that
a plaintiff's status as a statutory employee was to be determined solely
by the court, found that the plaintiff was not an "employee" within the
act. The issue of negligence was then submitted to the jury which re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, con-
cluding that the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, a statutory employee.2"
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the plaintiff's
status under the act was one of fact to be determined by a jury in a federal
court, notwithstanding contrary state provisions.
In reaching the decision in the Byrd case, the Court adopted a two-
step approach for determining whether state or federal law governs a
particular aspect of litigation. The first step is to inquire whether the
disputed rule is an integral part of the parcel of state-created rights, i.e.,
whether it exNpresses a state policy which is intended to be "bound up
with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.""0  The
second step of the Byrd inquiry seeks to determine whether there are "af-
firmative countervailing considerations" which oppose application of the
28. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
29. 238 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956).
30. 356 U.S. at 535.
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state rule. This second inquiry asks whether the federal rule performs a
function which is fundamental to the federal interest of administering
justice."' The Court concluded under the facts in Byrd that the manner
in which the federal judicial system "distributes functions between the
judge and jury, and under the influence-if not the command-of the
Seventh Amendment, assigns disputed questions of fact to the jury" 2 is
an essential characteristic of the federal judicial process, and one which
prevails over considerations of outcome uniformity.
The Parcel of Rights Approach to State Policy
Byrd's rejection of the view that a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction is merely another court of the state illustrates a significant
change in the judicial approach to Erie problems. Nonetheless, the "par-
cel of rights" criterion adopted by the Court was first relied upon to de-
termine whether a state rule purporting to govern the conduct of trial
should be applied in diversity actions in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap.s
There it was held that a Texas rule, which placed the burden of proof in
quiet title actions upon the party attacking legal title, applied to diversity
actions. The court determined that the rule was an expression of state
policy designed to afford the bona fide purchaser of Texas realty added
assurance of title. This decision appears sound. Burden of proof and
other rules traditionally regarded as "procedural" are intended not only
to guide the orderly and logical progression of trial, but are often designed
to enlarge or qualify the rights and obligations which attach to the basic
"substantive" relationship. If federal courts are to effectuate state policy
it is essential that they apply the rules bound up with the definition of the
rights and obligations of the parties.
Other rules pertaining to conduct of trial are not intended to define
the parcel of rights asserted, but rather seek to protect a fundamental in-
terest extraneous to the administration of justice. For example, the rule
that confidential communications between husband and wife are not ad-
missible as evidence may contravene federal prescriptions designed to fa-
cilitate the orderly and efficient administration of the judicial process.
The marital communication privilege manifests a state's decision that
confidence is essential to the maintenance of the marriage relationship,
and that the possible injury to the marriage by disclosure outweighs any
benefit of a judicial investigation of the truth. 4 The respect which Erie
attributes a state's authority to pursue policies different from those of
31. This aspect of the Byrd approach is discussed in text accompanying note 37
infra.
32. 356 U.S. at 537.
33. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
34. 8 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 2332 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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its neighbors logically includes recognition of state prerogative to prevent
any single right from encroaching upon other fundamental interests
which are proper objects of state protection. Failure to respect such col-
lateral interests could more profoundly affect state policy than the result
of a litigation. Yet, the outcome test does not adequately protect the
state's interest in safeguarding the marriage in this instance, for the
privilege would be "outcome-determinative" and hence applicable only if
the excluded evidence were essential to proving a litigant's claim. Here
state policy obviously is not concerned with the result of litigation, but
with protecting the marriage. The parcel of rights approach would ap-
pear to respect the state's interest in the matter not from the narrow view
of a specific claim, but as an integrated legal system which defines indi-
vidual rights and obligations against a background of comprehensive
state policy.
A third category of rules which govern the conduct of trial is com-
prised of those not concerned with the integrity of an underlying legal
relationship, but of rules that are directly aimed at regulating the judicial
process. Rules of this nature, exclusionary rules of evidence, for example,
embody a forum concept of objective fairness. The litigating forum's
interest in a just and expedient adjudication of each controversy's merits
suggests that it should have the authority to prescribe rules which guar-
anty integrity in the judicial process.3"
Categorization of procedural rules fails to protect adequately state
interests, however, for rules do not bear their policy on their face; they
acquire meaning only through the functions assigned them in carrying
out state policy. To illustrate, exclusionary rules of evidence do not
prima facie purport to protect the integrity of primary relationships
which are the legitimate objects of state control. Rather, they seek to
regulate the judicial process in a manner somewhat opposed to the broad
federal policy of basing an adjudication on all the relevant evidence.36
However, where an exclusionary rule combines, for example, with that
of the presumptive validity of marriage, it impedes attack upon the mar-
35. See generally Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rides in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L.
REv. 692 (1963), where it is concluded that a uniform system of evidence rules, with
some exceptions, may be applied in diversity actions, and that state rules relating to the
competence of witnesses should be thoroughly re-examined in view of their relationship
to state interests. The outcome test is concerned only with uniformity of result and
fails to consider either the state interest to be served by a particular characterization
or the relationship of the rule in question to the intricacies of the process of adjudication.
Comment, Federal Rule 43 (a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and the Iuplica-
tions of the Erie Doctrine, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1049, 1073 (1962).
36. This policy is expressed in FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) which provides for admis-
sibility if sanctioned by either federal or state practice. See Ladd, supra note 35, at 697.
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riage and thus helps effectuate the state's interest in preserving marital
solidarity.
In determining whether a given rule generally thought to regulate
the conduct of trial is an integral part of the parcel of state-created rights,
a diligent inquiry must be made as to whether the state policy underlying
the rule is designed to enlarge or qualify the rights stemming from the
relationship. If it is not, the federal rule prevails. But, even if it is
determined that the rule is so interwoven into the state policy surrounding
the relationship as to be an integral part thereof, the inquiry is not at an
end. As illustrated by exclusionary rules of evidence, the great bulk of
adjective law does aid state policy in some manner. The second step of
the Byrd approach must then be applied to determine whether the federal
interest of administering justice to all litigants in the federal forum re-
quires application of an independent federal rule.
Countervailing Considerations: Charting the Course After Byrd
The real significance of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.
was the Court's recognition that conformity to state law is not confined
only by the intrinsic limitations of the Erie doctrine, i.e., to instances
where the state rule is an integral part of the parcel of state-created rights
asserted. Conformity is further limited by countervailing considerations
due the integrity of the federal judicial process. That acknowledgment
represents a return to the fundamental principle of federalism at the ba-
sis of Erie, viz., that the state's interest in a relationship created by it re-
quires application of state policy to define the rights and obligations
which flow from that relationship, and that the rights thus defined are
secured by an independent federal judicial process. That is the principle
so often obscured by the superficial formulae enunciated in the early
cases which applied Erie. While federalism demands the effectuation of
state rights and obligations, the rules of the litigating forum which pertain
to the administration of justice must be respected in adjudicating those
rights.
As noted, where a state rule is bound up with the rights and obliga-
tions created by state law, federal courts must determine whether de-
parture from the federal rule is too high a price for giving effect to state
policy. They must decide whether the departure will so detract from the
integrity of the federal judicial process as to impair the ability of the
forum to independently adjudicate litigants' rights. While this process
clearly intimates that state policy cannot dictate compliance with state
rules where inimical to federal judicial independence, the court in the Byrd
case did not decide authoritatively whether an outcome determinative
federal rule could prevail over a state rule intended to be an integral part
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of the parcel of state-created rights." However, the recent case of Sim-
ler v. Conncre5 indicates that substantial federal interests may require ad-
herence to federal determinants of trial notwithstanding contrary state
policy.
In Sinler the court confronted the issue of jury trial availability
where a client petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment de-
termining his liability to an attorney under a contingent fee contract.
The validity of the contract was drawn into question under an Oklahoma
statute which provided that contracts entered into between attorney and
client while such relationship exists and which are to the advantage of the
attorney, are presumed fraudulent. 9 Construing the statute the Okla-
homa Supreme Court had held that, as the issue of contract cancellation
had to be resolved before relief could be granted, the action was equitable
in character and the issue of fraud was triable to the court.4" In a unani-
mous per curiam opinion the United States Supreme Court held:
The right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined
as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions.
The federal policy of favoring jury trials is of historic and con-
tinuing strength.. . Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-
operative, Inc.. . Only through a holding that the jury-trial
right is to be determined according to federal law can the uni-
formity in its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh
Amendment be achieved. In diversity cases, of course, the
substantive dimension of the claim asserted finds its source in
state law, . . . but the characterization of that state-created
claim as legal or equitable for purposes of whether a right to
jury trial is indicated must be made by recourse to federal law.4
37. In fact, the Court in Byrd decided that the rule in question was "merely a
mode or manner of enforcing the immunity." 356 U.S. at 536. This phrase was employed
in Guaranty Trust in contradistinction to state rules which would "significantly affect
the result of a litigation" if disregarded in the federal courts. Thus, while it was
recognized that there were rules to which the outcome determinitive test did not apply,
the rationale underlying the exception was that such rules were too insignificant to
affect outcome. The "countervailing consideration" approach adopted by Byrd is clearly
at odds with this rationale, and insists upon the independence of federal rules because
of their significance. Although the rule in question in the Byrd case was considered
to be "merely a mode or manner of enforcing the immunity," the Court went on to
suggest, in dicta, that even though the state rule is bound up in the parcel of state
created rights it cannot in all cases apply in the federal forum.
38. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 7 (1961). This statute permits contingent fee contracts,
not to exceed 50% of recovery, but where they are entered during the time the relation-
ship of attorney-client exists, they are presumptively fraudulent. The statute thus places
the burden on the attorney to show that the contract is fair, just and equitable. Haunstein
v. McCalister, 172 Okla. 613, 46 P.2d 552 (1935).
40. Southard v. MacDonald, 360 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1961).
41. 372 U.S. at 222.
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Although citing Byrd as authority for the federal policy favoring jury
trial, it is significant that the Court did not apply the first step of the
Byrd approach; it made no effort to determine whether the state rule was
an integral part of the parcel of state-created rights. The single conclu-
sion to be drawn from Simler is that the state interest, no matter how ex-
tensive, can not outweigh the availability of a jury trial where a litigant
is, as a matter of federal law, entitled to such a trial.
Although the issue in both Byrd and Simler concerned the availabil-
ity of a jury trial, in neither instance did the Court rest its decision on the
command of the seventh amendment." Instead, the distinction drawn in
the Byrd case between the "mandate" and the "influence" of the amend-
ment was adhered to in Simler where the federal "policy" favoring jury
trial was the countervailing consideration which required application-of
independent federal rules. While the Court did not in either case deline-
ate the scope of the federal policy favoring jury trial, there is no reason
to assume that the right extended by this policy would not be at least co-
extensive with the protection afforded by the mandate of the constitu-
tional provision. The guarantee of the seventh amendment comprehends
several aspects of trial. It protects the common law distinction between
the province of the court and jury by preserving the control which the
judge exercises over the finder of fact."3 It also encompasses all rules of
adjective law incident to the basic right and essential to the preservation
of its character, protects the substantive right as distinguished from mat-
42. The amendment provides that "in suits at common law . . . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact, tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined,
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common-law."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. It was early recognized that "suits at common law" was
employed in contradistinction to controversies in equity and admiralty, and did not
deprive a litigant of the amendment's protection where the right in question was created
by statute. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
In Byrd, the Court specifically stated that the decision was not intended to intimate
any view as to the application of the seventh amendment since the case was disposed
of on non-constitutional grounds. 356 U.S. at 537. The Court did intimate a constitutional
ground for their decision at one point in the Singer case when speaking of the uniformity
demanded by the seventh amendment. 372 U.S. at 222. This, however, appears to have
been in reference to the policy favoring jury trials which derives from the "influence" of
the amendment, and is consistent with the policy of the Court not to adjudicate a con-
stitutional issue when, as there, it is not essential to the disposition of the case. Dissenting
from a previous order which remanded the case for rehearing before the court of appeals
in view of a recent decision by the state supreme court, Chief Justice Warren, and Mr.
Justices Black and Douglas, stated that in their opinion the case should have been
remanded for trial of disputed issues of fact by the jury "as required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . our prior decisions and the Seventh Amendment." 367
U.S. at 486. This indicates that the dissenting Justices, at this juncture at least, con-
sidered the right as deriving from something other than the mandate of the amendment.
43. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1941); Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U.S. 1
(1899).
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ters of form, and thus facilitates the adoption of improved methods of
trial.4"
Even if the policy favoring jury trial was all that Byrd and Simler
sought to protect, there would nevertheless be few rules governing the
conduct of trial which would not fall within its purview. The receipt of
evidence, giving of instructions and setting aside a verdict all are tools
through which a court exercises control over the jury. In spite of the
comprehensive nature of the jury trial right, however, it is but a single
element of the federal judicial process. It is thus fortunate that the scope
of the countervailing consideration principle need not be viewed so
narrowly.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Monarch Ins. Co. v.
Spach" elaborated on the principles which oppose conformity to state
rules governing conduct of trial. The court reversed a district court rul-
ing that a Florida statute excluded evidence offered to impeach certain
testimony. The state rule was held not outcome-determinative, since the
jury could credit or reject the testimony notwithstanding the proffered
evidence, and therefore did not control in the federal forum. In dictum
the court continued:
Not the least of these countervailing considerations is the indis-
pensable necessity that a tribunal, if it is to be an independent
court administering law, must have the capacity to regulate the
manner by which cases are to be tried and facts are to be pre-
sented in the search for the truth of the cause. As Erie epito-
mized, the constitutional factors subject federal courts in diver-
sity cases to special limitations. But the jurisdiction of courts
in such cases is no less constitutional than in non-diversity liti-
gation. The judicial power of the United States vested by Art.
III of the Constitution "in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may * establish" is declared to "extend to all cases, in Law
and Equity *; to Controversies * -*-between Citizens of
different States * * *."" A United States District Court clothed
with power by Congress pursuant to the Constitution is not a
mere adjunct to a state's judicial machinery. In entertaining di-
versity cases it is responding to a constitutional demand made
effective by congressional action and, as the recent abstention
cases have made so clear, it has a constitutional duty to hear and
adjudicate. Investment of this profound power and duty car-
ries with it the capacity, if not the affirmative obligation, to pre-
44. Ibid.
45. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
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scribe such rules as will enable the federal district courts to ful-
fill these constitutional demands without, at the same time, tres-
passing upon others of equal and fundamental nature.46
Thus, the jury trial right is not the only element of the federal judi-
cial process protected from unqualified conformity to state law. As
Monarch indicates, the integrity of the federal judiciary as an independent
forum is itself a countervailing consideration. This independence is es-
sential not as an end in itself, but to insure litigants before a federal
forum an independent adjudication of state-created rights by a distinc-
tively federal judicial process. While the federal policy favoring jury
trial is "of historic and continuing strength,"4r that particular aspect of
the federal judicial process does not prevail against contrary state law
because it enjoys an innate sanctity. Rather, it prevails because the man-
ner in which federal courts distribute functions between court and jury
is a distinctive characteristic of that process which is essential to its in-
dependence as a system for administering justice.
The search for the elements of trial that are necessary characteristics
of the federal judicial process, and thus controlled by federal law, is not
confined to express congressional policy or common law tradition. The
federal interest of adjudicating merits in the most just and expedient
manner can be advanced only if federal courts are free to improve the
process of judicial administration." The recent revisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure illustrate the need for a frequent modernization
of the judicial process corresponding to the changing demands which are
made upon the system.49 The evaluation, rejection and innovation of
techniques incident to the adjudicatory process is only a part of the fed-
eral judiciary's responsibility for administering justice. Fulfillment of
this responsibility requires the adoption of improved methods of trial
either through legislation or judicial innovation.
It might be thought that Erie prohibits the application of judge made
federal law in diversity cases, but the First Circuit repudiated that notion
in Jaftez Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc." Jaftex involved an action to re-
46. Id. at 407.
47. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
48. Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248 (1963).
49. The amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), effective as of July 1, 1963, while
not momentuous in itself perhaps best evidences a response to the varying demands
placed upon the federal judicial system. This amendment eliminated the practice which
impliedly required the jury's assent by submitting the case to the jury under a directed
verdict. The change was designed to expedite the process of adjudication, and thus aid in
alleviating the congested docket problem of federal courts. See generally, Judicial
Conference of the United States, Amendment to certain Rides of Cizil Procedure for the
United States District Courts 1962, 31 F.R.D. 621 (1963).
50. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
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cover damages for injuries suffered when clothing that had been pro-
cessed by the defendant ignited and severely burned the plaintiff. De-
fendant Jaftex sought to implead the ultimate manufacturer Randolph
Mills, which asserted that it was not subject to service of process under
the laws of the forum state and thus, under the Erie doctrine, was not
amenable to service in a federal diversity action brought in that state.
The district court vacated the service of process on Randolph Mills.5"
The Court of Appeals determined that service was valid under either
federal or state practice, and therefore reversed the district court. 2 Judge
Clark however, speaking for the court, went on to reject the contention
that the doors of a federal court must always be closed to litigants who
are barred from state courts. While rules governing access to state
courts often express a policy which seeks to regulate the basic relation-
ships that are a legitimate concern of the state, Judge Clark found the
jurisdictional issue before him to be a matter vitally affecting federal
interests which did not concern state policy. He was of the opinion that
the question was only which federal court Jaftex could enter, since it
could have brought its claim in Randolph Mills' home district. 3  The
determination of which federal court should adjudicate the parties' rights
was considered by the court to be a federal matter whose disposition
would not offend state policy."
No federal statute explicitly provides for extrastate service on
a foreign corporation in such instances. Indeed, the absence of a con-
gressional enactment providing for extrastate service, in addition to the
broad provision of Rule 4(d) (7) for service in the manner prescribed
by the law of the state in which the federal court sits, indicates a general
willingness to allow state law to control.5 Nonetheless, Judge Clark con-
cluded that Erie did not prevent the federal court from formulating a
51. Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
52. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. Jaftex, processor of the cloth, and Wendy Wilson, the original defendant and
manufacturer of the allegedly defective garment, were both New York corporations.
Thus no question of amenability to process was raised when Wendy Wilson served a
third party complaint on Jaftex. However, Jaftex in turn sought to implead Randolph
Mills, a North Carolina corporation and manufacturer of the cloth, by service of process
upon the New York sales agent of Randolph Mills. The district court reviewed New
York law and concluded that where a foreign corporation is not physically within thejurisdiction and is represented only by a person who sells on commission as part of such
person's general business of acting in behalf of primary sellers, the corporation is not
subject to state court jurisdiction. Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
54. Ibid. The Second Circuit overlooked the significance of its holding in JafeX
on the outcome test. By using independent federal standards to determine place of trial,
the court also determined the substantive body of law which would apply. Note, Erie v.
Tompkhins and Federal Determinants of Place of Trial, 37 IND. L.J. 352 (1961).
55. FFD. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7). See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, in 1961 ANN. SUtvEY
Am. L. 29-54.
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mode of proceeding at odds with a state rule." In Jaftex, the federal in-
terest of avoiding unnecessary and inefficient litigation was considered
sufficient to require judicially innovated extrastate service.
This aspect of Jafte% appears sound. Erie inaugurated a new con-
cept of the law-making function of the federal courts, not an abdication
of that function. It would be most incongruous if the doctrine recogniz-
ing the exclusive authority of state courts to promulgate policy in matters
of local concern denies a like authority in federal courts as to matters of
common federal interest. Federal courts fashion law to fill the interstices
of Congressional enactments in an effort to uniformly effectuate legisla-
tive purpose." Similarly, the administration of justice in a nation-wide
network of courts is not a local concern, but a distinctly federal matter,
and it calls for a uniform effort to administer and improve the judicial
process. Whether the authority of the federal judiciary to shape the
legal consequences which attach to a transaction and to formulate rules
of adjective law stem from the same or different sources is of little mo-
ment."3 The crucial point is that Erie does not prevent the application of
judge-made "procedural" law which has "substantive" overtones.
Where there is a difference between a state and federal conduct of
trial rule, the considerations are the same whether either or both are legis-
lative enactments or uncodified judge-made law. Erie confirmed the
competency of state courts as expositors of state policy. Similarly, the
creative function of the federal judiciary in promulgating rules for the
administration of justice is an essential characteristic of the judicial
process. The application of judge-made federal law in these instances
differs considerably from the pre-Erie practice of applying "federal com-
mon law" instead of state decisional law. The difference lies in adjudi-
cating a controversy by an independent judicial process giving conscien-
56. 282 F.2d at 513.
57. The assault on the federal common law was immediately qualified in Hinder-
lider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), where the Court
declared that it would continue to apply judge-made federal law to complement Con-
gressional regulation of interstate rivers. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943) enunciated the authority of federal courts to apply a federal common
law, distinct from the law of any particular state, to controversies which so affect the
federal government and its operations that a uniform federal rule is essential. This
would appear to be a dynamic concept susceptable to adaption to the changing emphasis
on federal-state regulation of various relationships. For example, this concept has been
invoked to allow application of independent federal rules of construction to a sub-
contract between a prime contractor under a government defense contract and a third
person. American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640
(9th Cir. 1961). See generally Leflar, supra note 55.
58. See Bergner & Szasz, Erie Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal
Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 651, 674 (1955), where it is concluded that Erie did not
impugn the authority of the federal judiciary to create uniform substantive law in the
exercise of the judicial power, but that since Erie there has not been a federal general
common law, only many federal common laws differing in source and substance.
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tious regard to local policy, and the deliberate fashioning of extrinsic
precepts in disregard of state interests. 9
In determining which of divergent rules applies in diversity litiga-
tion, the importance of the rule as part of an independent system must be
weighed against its function as an element of state policy which defines
the parcel of state-created rights. This balancing technique required by
the Byrd approach preserves the dual character of diversity jurisdiction.
It implements the constitutional plan of an independent forum for the
fair and just enforcement of state-created rights and, in applying state
policy in matters concerning the legitimate interests of the state, it adheres
to the principles of federalism.
III. APPLICATION OF THE BYRD-SIMLER APPROACH
Application of the Byrd-Sinler approach to determine whether a
given aspect of trial is governed by state or federal law is complicated by
the fact that divergent state and federal rules may be assigned different
tasks in their respective systems. A rule may be interwoven into the
parcel of state-created rights and also perform an essential function in
the administration of the federal judicial process. This problem is illus-
trated by instances where state and federal rules are at odds on the suf-
ficiency of evidence required to submit a disputed issue of fact to the
jury." A state provision that the issues of contributory negligence and
59. Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 440 (1958).
60. The Supreme Court, in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959),
recognized that whether state or federal standards are to be applied in determining the
quantum of evidence required to take a disputed issue of fact to the jury is still an
open question. The Court declined to decide the issue, however, since counsel had not
briefed the question, and disposed of the case on other grounds. The pre-Erie case of
Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931), had once mooted this question by
holding that a state constitutional provision requiring submission of the issue of con-
tributory negligence "in all cases whatsoever" did not apply in the federal forum. Chief
Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, found that the district court had acted properly
in directing a verdict where the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory
negligence, notwithstanding the contrary state constitutional provision. The Chief Justice
reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act did not require the federal court to apply state
law where to do so would alter the "essential character or function" of that court,
and that the judge-jury relationship is "an essential factor in the process for which the
Federal Constitution provides." Id. at 94.
Subsequent to the decision of Erie, the Tenth Circuit followed the Herron case when
faced with an almost identical state rule in Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d
144 (10th Cir. 1942). The Herron case concerned the allocation of functions between
judge and jury in the federal courts and this, the circuit court thought, was not affected
by Eric. This position is supported by the extensive reliance upon Herron in Byrd
where the Court commented:
Concededly the Herron case was decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
but even when Swift v. Tyson . . . was governing law and allowed federal
courts sitting in diversity cases to disregard state decisional law, it was never
thought that state statutes or constitutions were similarly to be disregarded. ...
Yet Herron held that state statutes and constitutional provisions could not disrupt
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assumption of risk in all cases must be questions of fact for the jury"*
may evince a state policy designed to favor injured plaintiffs by allowing a
jury to mitigate the harshness of the law.62 On the other hand, granting
that whether the proof shows the necessary elements of a cause of action
is a question of state law, determining whether a disputed issue presents a
question of fact or of law is an integral aspect of the judicial process.
Moreover, while a state rule may affect the underlying state-created rights
of litigants, it may infringe upon the right of a party in the federal forum
to challenge the sufficiency of his adversary's evidence.63
It will be argued that application of different rules concerning the
quantum of evidence required to submit a disputed question of fact to the
jury will create a situation conducive to forum shopping. The mere like-
lihood that the Byrd-Sinler approach would influence a litigant's choice
of forum does not, however, prevent adherence to independent federal
standards of trial. The obvious reason a litigant prefers one forum to
another is his anticipation that the ultimate disposition of the controversy
will be more favorable to him in the selected forum. Differences in out-
come as an inducement to the selection of forum were obviated by Erie in-
or alter the essential character of function of a federal court.
356 U.S. at 539.
There is a lack of unanimity among the lower federal courts on the quantum
of evidence issue. Compare Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441 (6th Cir.
1960) (state law controls), with Johnson v. Buckley, 317 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1963)
(federal law controls), Davis Frozen Foods v. Norfolk & So. R. Co., 204 F.2d 839
(4th Cir. 1953), and Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1960).
But see Berwanger v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 290 F.2d 588 (3rd
Cir. 1962) (affirmed district court decision applying state law). It is worthy of note
that Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962), applied independent federal
standards upon the ground that Byrd had concluded the issue.
61. Apiz CoNsT. art. 18 § 5 (1910). This provision was involved in Herron v.
Southern Pac. Co., supra note 60.
62. Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries, and
Directed Verdicts Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 1516 (1953). There the
position is taken that notwithstanding the state policy attributed the state rule, inde-
pendent federal standards should be applied in view of the constitutional mandate of the
seventh amendment. However, the note continues, "since it is a minimum right to jury
trial that the Amendment guarantees, it might be argued that federal courts should
follow state practice where a state provides a jury but the federal court does not." Id. at
1520. This characterization of the jury trial guarantee as a minimal standard fails to
recognize the significance of the jury trial right as a two-sided proposition. See note
43 supra and accompanying text. Not only does the amendment protect the litigant's
right to a jury determination of disputed issues of fact in accordance with the rules of
common law as they existed in 1789, but his adversary is guaranteed the right to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence brought forward in support of the issue.
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1941). Indeed, if there is any basis in fact
for the apprehension that out-of-state litigants would be prejudiced if forced to seek
relief in local courts (see note 1 supra), the right to challenge the sufficiency of an
adversary's evidence would be instrumental in protecting the out-of-state litigant from
local racial, religious and economic bias. Without this guarantee, jury speculation
would afford a ready means for vindicating those prejudices.
63. See the discussion in note 62 supra.
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sofar as they resulted from disregard of state policy. Yet, to the extent
that differences in result reflect divergencies in the adjective law of the
two systems, they will and must continue to influence a litigant's choice
of forum as long as two independent systems have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the enforcement of state-created rights.
A far more objectionable aspect of forum shopping is the uncertainty
at the primary transaction level which results from the prospective choice
of forum. Diversity principles should not enable one party to determine
the legal consequences which attach to a transaction, and thus defeat the
just expectations of the other party. They should instead leave the
rights and obligations of a state-created relationship substantially un-
affected. However, while certainty of legal consequence is desirable,
there are countervailing considerations. A party who engages in trans-
actions within the jurisdiction of foreign courts has been assured since
the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 the even-handed justice of
the federal judicial process. If a state rule so deviates from federal con-
cepts of objective fairness as to change the character of the basic rights
and obligations of the parties, the need for independent federal rules ap-
pears all the greater. Thus, a change of forum justifiably alters the legal
consequences which attach to a state-created relationship when the change
occurs through higher standards of fairness in the administration of
justice.
Furthermore, it appears that any "uncertainty" from a conceivable
difference in legal consequence should not be determinitive of whether a
state or federal rule governs. A right which flows from a legal relation-
ship has little value in itself, but its nature depends largely upon the
characteristics it acquires in the judicial system in which it is enforced.
Thus, it has been observed that "the nature of the tribunal where suits are
tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of ac-
tion."64 Where a party to a contemplated transaction will be entitled in
the event of litigation to an adjudication of his rights in a federal forum,
the influence which the independent rules of that forum will have upon
the rights and obligations that attach to the transaction becomes a part of
those rights and must be reckoned with at the planning stage. It is there-
fore anomalous to assert that a litigant who invokes the aid of a federal
court to adjudicate state-created rights "determines" the legal conse-
quences of a transaction and defeats the expectations of his adversary.
Instead, he is merely asserting his rights in a manner contemplated by
the transaction.
A fundamental criticism of applying divergent rules which might in-
64. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
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duce forum shopping is that citizens of the forum state are discriminated
against because greater freedom is allowed out-of-state parties in select-
ing the litigating forum. 5 The non-citizen plaintiff is free to choose the
forum most favorable to his cause, while the defendant has no choice but
to defend his rights in that forum. Yet, it is far from clear that this in-
equality in choice is unfair. The very existence of diversity jurisdiction
presupposes that choice of forum is necessary for a fair adjudication of
out-of-state litigants' rights. On the other hand, there would appear no
reason for affording citizens of the forum state the same opportunity to
avail themselves of the federal judicial process. A citizen may share in
the political life of the state. He is thus responsible for its institutions
and can reasonably be required to accept the state courts determination
of his rights.
In addition it might be objected that adherence to a state rule which
would require a case to be submitted to the jury would not impair sub-
stantially the ability of federal courts fairly and adequately to determine
litigants' rights since the court may, in its discretion, set aside a verdict
as against the weight of the evidence. But the federal policy of securing
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action""0 weighs
against this argument since resort to a new trial would entail unnecessary
delay and expense. Additionally, the argument avoids the central issue,
for the question of whether state or federal law is to govern the allocation
of functions between judge and jury must be resolved in either instance.
The considerations involved in determining whether federal courts
should be bound by state rules which would require the judge to submit a
given question to a jury do not differ materially from those involved in
the Byrd and Simler cases where application of the state rule would have
required that a question of fact be withheld from the jury. In both in-
65. The present provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, § 1441 (1958), defining juris-
diction in diversity of citizenship cases, are substantially the same as those enacted
by the First Congress. See note 2 supra. Under those provisions, the following parties
may invoke the federal judicial power, either by instituting an action in the federal
forum or through removal of an action commenced in the state court: (a) out-of-state
plaintiff, (b) out-of-state defendant, and (c) citizen-plaintiff. While the plaintiff who
is a citizen of the forum state may select the forum by instituting an action, his choice
of the state court is subject to the out-of-state defendant's right to remove the action to
the federal court. On the contrary, the out-of-state plaintiff's choice is absolute, for in
no event does the defendant who is a citizen of the forum have any voice in the selection
of the tribunal which will determine his rights.
A revision of diversity jurisdiction suggested by the American Law Institute would
also withdraw the initial choice of forum from the plaintiff who is a citizen of the
forum state by limiting federal diversity jurisdiction to removal by the out-of-state
defendant in such instances. ALl, op. cit. supra note 2. The rationale upon which this
revision is based is that the litigant who is a citizen of the forum state has a voice in the
political affairs of that state, and may properly be held responsible for the method
in which the state's judicial machinery operates. Id. at 41.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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stances the method in which the federal judicial system distributes func-
tions between court and jury is at issue. In both situations, the signifi-
cance of this distribution as an element of the federal judicial process
must be balanced against the role which the state rule, as an element of
state policy, plays in defining the state-created rights asserted. The
judge-jury relationship is an essential characteristic of the federal judicial
process, and is vital to the independence of the federal forum. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that the state rule expresses a state policy, the
federal rule prevails. As indicated by the Simler case, frustration of state
policy must necessarily be tolerated in matters pertaining to conduct of
trial where the alternative is to sacrifice federal judicial independence.
CONCLUSION
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins requires that state legislative and judicial
policy be respected by federal courts when adjudicating claims derived
from state-created rights. This doctrine presents a difficult problem
concerning rules governing the conduct of trial in cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the party's diverse citi-
zenship. Since the policy which a state expresses in "procedural" rules
often is intended to define the rights and obligations which flow from
state-created relationships, it would appear that the federal court should
apply state rules pertaining to conduct of trial when adjudicating state-
created rights. Federal diversity jurisdiction is, however, an integral
part of our federalism and serves a dual function. A federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction not only is required to effectuate the
state policy expressed in rules which define a state-created right, but it
must also provide an independent forum for the fair and just adjudica-
tion of those rights.
A litigant who has properly invoked the federal judicial power there-
fore possesses two distinct rights-that which derives from relationships
created by state law and defined by state policy, and the right to a fair
and just determination of the state-created rights by an independent
judicial process. There is no simple dichotomy which separates the rules
which are bound up in these two distinct rights for, while the state rule
may be integrated with the parcel of state-created rights, a divergent
federal rule may perform an essential function in the administration of
justice. When such a rule is confronted, the significance of the state rule
as an element of state policy must be weighed against the affect which
departure from the federal rule will have upon the ability of the federal
forum to make a fair and just determination according to independent
concepts of objective fairness. Only through this balancing technique
can the precarious equilibrium demanded by our federalism to protect
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a litigant's state-created right be achieved, and encroachment upon his
right to an independent federal trial be stemmed.
The delineation of state and federal law which is necessary to pre-
serve this equilibrium cannot be attained by so-called "tests" which pur-
port to categorize various "procedural" rules on the basis of correlations
supposed to exist between the categories into which the rules are fitted,
and the rights which the rules represent. The Byrd-Simler approach does
not create a talismanic dichotomy which separates state and federal control
over diversity litigation, but it does succeed in laying bare the issues in
a manner never before achieved. The return to the principles of federal-
ism which is required by this approach, while it does not offer expediency,
affords a basis upon which federal courts may build a sound delineation
between state and federal authority.
SEGREGATION LITIGATION IN THE 1960'S: IS THERE AN
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS?
The flood of school segregation litigation has spilled over the dike
of the Mason-Dixon line into the courtrooms of the northern states. This
litigation in the north subsequent to the decision in Brozmz v. Board of
Education' is a relatively new phenomenon, occurring mainly in the last
three years, and presents a number of new legal issues for analysis. Liti-
gation centers around the administration of most northern school systems
on the neighborhood school plan which in many instances has resulted in
extensive racial imbalance within individual schools of a system.' The
problem has been labeled in much of the recent literature as "de facto"
segregation. This choice of labels is unfortunate for in the context of
public school litigation segregation is a legal conclusion and implies un-
constitutionality; thus, the label assumes the conclusion of the issue.
The major legal problem arising from this factual context is whether
racial imbalance is unconstitutional in and of itself. The determination
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The use of the neighborhood school plan as the primary method of school
organization is so widespread and so traditional that exact figures as to the extent of
its use do not seem to be available. "Attendance zones constitute the time-honored
method of apportioning children among schools. . . ." [1961] 2 Comm'N oN CIVIL
RIGHTS REP. 20. Apparently educational researchers have never felt it worthwhile
to determine exactly what per cent of the nation's school systems operate on this plan.
However, a rough indication of its extensive use is given by a recent nation-wide poll
of school administrators in which 95 per cent of those replying favored neighborhood
schools. Sanctlio Neighborhood Attendance Policy, 70 NATION'S SCHOOLs 55 (Jul. 1962).
The term racial imbalance is used in this note to denote the disproportionate repre-
sentation of white and Negro races within the schools of a system.
